Hence we will also reverse the summary judgment on that claim. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we will conclude that the defendant employer's summary judgment motion did not negate plaintiffs prima facie case of age discrimination. In the published portion of this opinion, we will therefore reverse the summary judgment on plaintiffs claim of breach of implied contract. Although the issue is close, we conclude that the evidence did not conclusively establish that there were no triable issues of material fact regarding the meaning of the parties' implied agreement and whether what the plaintiff employee did amounted to "good cause" to terminate within that meaning. Both sides presented skillfully prepared and helpful letter briefs. To assist in further development of the issues, we authorized further briefing. It is not so clear from the evidence presented, however, that a reasonable trier of fact would necessarily have to resolve the issues in favor of the defendant employer.
The evidence suggests a strong possibility, perhaps a strong likelihood, that a trier of fact would resolve the issues in favor of the defendant employer on the "good cause" termination issue. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant employer. Plaintiff employee sued defendant employer for 1) breach of an implied-in-fact contract not to terminate except for "good cause," and 2) age discrimination. Chamberlin, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Respondents. Paul Baskett, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
B119881.Ĭourt of Appeal, Second District, Division Two. BINDER, Plaintiff and Appellant,ĪETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents.
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